Security Challenges in the Dutch Caribbean

Summary

This work examines security challenges facing the Dutch Caribbean, including narcotrafficking and other forms of organized crime, money laundering, Venezuelan and other refugee flows, and the little-understood activities of criminal groups operating within the region’s Chinese minority communities. It also examines the successes and challenges in coordination between law enforcement and other government entities in the Dutch Caribbean, and between the Dutch Caribbean and the European Netherlands, with the French, English and Spanish-speaking Caribbean, and with the range of other states and actors in the region. This work recommends that both the U.S. and Dutch government pay more attention to the challenges of the Caribbean part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and more fully take advantage of opportunities to work together more closely in addressing those challenges, and also in leveraging the lessons of good governance in the region, as they wrestle with difficulties elsewhere in the Caribbean.

Keywords: Dutch Caribbean, Netherlands, narcotrafficking, Venezuela, money laundering, organized crime.

Introduction

From October 21-23, 2024, I had the opportunity to participate as a keynote speaker in a conference in Bonaire focused on intelligence-based policing in the Dutch Caribbean. The event provided me with the opportunity to talk to a range of senior officials from across the region. It also enabled me to obtain a first-hand understanding of the evolving security challenges in a region under multiple, significant stresses, and whose situation receives relatively little attention in Washington D.C.

The Dutch Caribbean currently confronts reinforcing challenges. These include narcotrafficking and other organized crime, including actors from both Europe and the Americas. The region also faces concerns over an expanding population of Venezuelan and other refugees, money laundering, and possible but not proven activities of criminal groups within the Chinese minority populations, among others. The region is also working to improve coordination between law enforcement and other government in the European Netherlands and the island states of the Dutch Caribbean, coordination with the French, English and Spanish-speaking portion of

the region, and with the range of other states and actors with a role there. Despite such difficulties, the Dutch Caribbean is also an example of how good governance (however imperfect), can make a significant difference in confronting the challenges that face the region more broadly.

The Dutch Caribbean

The political structure of the Dutch Caribbean is complex, and little understood beyond the Kingdom of the Netherlands (KoN) and the island states and the special municipalities or public entities that are part of it. Indeed, sometimes it is not well understood by the European Dutch either. The configuration of the Kingdom is relatively new, dating from a major change in its governance structure on October 10, 2010 (10-10-10 in the local parlance). Those in government in the Kingdom and its constituent members are still wrestling with the legal, administrative, and practical adjustments to make the system work effectively today.

On 10-10-10, the Dutch islands of Curacao and Sint Martin joined Aruba and the European part of the Netherlands, also called the country of the Netherlands (the “mother country”) as autonomous countries within the Kingdom. Meanwhile, the Dutch islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustasius and Saba (the “BES” islands) became special municipalities of the country of the Netherlands.^[2]

The result of these changes was a system in which the “BES” islands became part of the country of the Netherlands. The public entities are responsible for tasks that are specific to the day-to-day needs of residents, like spatial planning, public housing, management of the environment, tourism and economic development. The central government of the Netherlands manages key responsibilities for the BES islands, especially tasks that relate to national standards and coordination across regions, for instance defense and foreign affairs, health care, education, public safety, justice and law enforcement. Despite being special municipalities, they are not part of the European Union, although they do have a special relationship and receive certain benefits. Meanwhile, Curacao, Aruba and Sint Martin (the “CAS” islands) continued bound by the Kingdom in foreign policy and defense matters. They also received some financial and administrative support from the Kingdom government in the Hague.

Geographically complicating matters, two of the sovereign CAS islands, Aruba and Curacao, and one of the European-administered BES islands, Bonaire, are located just off the coast of Venezuela, with the political and economic relationships and security challenges that accompany that proximity. Meanwhile, two of the European-administered BES islands, tiny Saba (population 2,060) and Sint Eustasius (population 3,204), and one of the sovereign CAS islands, Sint Martin, are located in the northern part of the lesser Antilles, with a different set of political and economic relationships and security imperatives, further complicating coordination between them.

Security Challenges of the Dutch Caribbean

The security challenges of the Dutch Caribbean are interdependent, but can be divided into matters of drug flows, money laundering, migration, cyber security, violence, firearms, gangs piracy, cybersecurity, and prisons.

Drug Flows. The narcotics-related challenges of the Dutch Caribbean are primarily driven by cocaine production in, and transshipment through, Colombia and Venezuela. These flows are destined partly for the United States, but increasingly also for Europe, where the price commanded for the drug is much higher. The significant increase in cocaine production in Colombia, an growth of 53% in 2023 alone according to the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Prevention (UNODC),^[3] in addition to collaboration of the populist leadership of Venezuela with narcotrafficking, has together greatly increased drug flows through the Dutch Caribbean, and associated challenges.

Off of Venezuela’s coast, Aruba and Curacao, and to a lesser extent, less commercially connected Bonaire, are impacted by fast boats and narcosubs that transit their waters en route to the Dominican Republic, and eventually the US and Europe.^[4] According to those consulted for this work, an estimated five to six go-fast vessels, each with approximately 1,600 kg of cocaine are estimated to transit the area daily.^[5] In addition, narcosubs increasingly pass through the region, sometimes even crossing the Atlantic.^[6]

Aruba and Curacao are also impacted by the smuggling of drugs in containers that pass through their ports. Many such containers which are “contaminated” with drugs either in the Islands or before reaching them, are bound destinations in Europe such as Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Hamburg.^[7] There have even been cases of drugs shipped in containers being used by the Dutch military to move items between the Caribbean part of the Netherlands and the European part, probably contaminated after they left the military facilities for shipment through commercial ports.^[8]

The transit of drugs through the airports of Aruba, Curacao, and Bonaire, of passengers smuggling drugs to Europe has also been a problem. The status of Bonaire as part of the country of the Netherlands, analogous to Puerto Rico’s relationship with the United States, means that drugs that penetrate Bonaire’s relatively tight port and airport controls, can more readily enter Europe.

To the northeast, in the lesser Antilles, the drug-related challenges of Sint Martin, Sint Eustatius and Saba are distinct from those of the Dutch islands closer to Venezuela. Sint Martin in particular, which shares the island with the French-governed dependency of Saint Martin, has become both a waypoint and a transit zone for drugs.^[9] The transits usually involve small boats moving northward through the Lesser Antilles toward the Bahamas, or alternatively, toward the Dominican Republic, before going on to Europe and the United States. The patchwork of different sovereign national waters in the area, whose seas are divided between Dutch, French, and other territories, makes coordination of drug intercepts particularly difficult. The narcotraffickers regularly exploit such administrative divisions and associated coordination issues by crossing from Dutch to French-controlled waters on the same island to escape pursuit.

Within both the Dutch islands close to Venezuela, and those in the northern Lesser Antilles, the relationship of persons on the islands moving drug, with criminal groups in the Dominican Republic is of particular concern, since the later serves as a regional hub for cocaine transits to both Europe and the United States.

Beyond cocaine, other drug flows through the Dutch Caribbean include the importation of high-priced marijuana from Canada into the region through the Dutch Caribbean, as well as synthetic drugs from Europe, paid for by cocaine exported to Europe from the region.^[10]

As drug connections between Latin America and the Caribbean and Europe have strengthened in recent years, European criminal groups have also increased their activities in the region. The Sicilian mafia is believed to be present in the Dutch Caribbean.^[11] The influential Italian Corallo family in Sint Martin has faced alegations, although unproven, regarding its ties to the Sicilian Mafia.^[12] Its patriarch, Francisco Corallo, was suspected to have funded the Movementu Futuro Kòrsou or Movement for the future of Curacao (MFK) party in Curacao. In 2016, MFK leader, and Curacao’s first Prime Minister after 10-10-10, Gerrit Schotte, was sentenced to three years n prison for bribery, forgery and money laundering in relation to the case.^[13]

The Albanian mafia including a group from Montenegro known as Kotor,^[14] and the “Moroccan” mafia, a group operating out of Holland, are also present in the Dutch Caribbean. Elements of the Turkish mafia are also believed to operate there, although their activities are believed to be more focused on the hotel sector.^[15]

Beyond European groups, other criminal entities from beyond the Dutch Caribbean have also come to the region. These include the Hells Angels, with a small group of the organization uncovered in Curacao.^[16]

In confronting narcotrafficking flows, authorities of the Kingdom governments have significant assets in the region, but are still capacity-challenged in intercepts involving go-fast boats, ports and airports.^[17]

The governments maintain three naval stations in the region: one on Aruba, one on Curacao, and one on Sint Martin. Each station supports an offshore patrol vessel (cutter) sized craft, approximately 3 metal shark intercept boats, and usually two Boston Whalers, used for other purposes. The Kingdom also periodically sends a frigate sized West-Indes Guard Ship (WIGS) to the region for 90-day deployments.^[18] It has plans in the works to renew its fleet of cutters deployed to the region, and to expand its personnel by approximately 100.^[19]

On the air side, the Kingdom maintains an Air Station in Curacao with two AW-139 helicopters, and 2 DeHavilland -8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). It maintains two of each type of aircraft to ensure that at least one helicopter, which can also operate from the WIGS ship when it is in theater, and one MPA is always available. The Dutch Navy has periodically deployed a MQ-9 long-endurance drone to support maritime domain awareness.

To support maritime domain awareness, the Dutch Coast Guard operates two maritime radars in Aruba, two in Bonaire, and two in Curacao. There are plans in place to acquire a new radar for Sint Martin, but without specific funding or a date yet.^[20]

One official consulted for this work estimated that only 20% of drug shipments passing through the Dutch Caribbean by go fast or container are intercepted. Because of this, authorities must make difficult decisions about which detected shipments to stop, knowing that the dedication of manpower and attention to seize and process one shipment, will allow others to get through. Such limits oblige authorities to try to pick the “biggest” shipments against which to intervene.

Money Laundering. Dutch Caribbean security officials consulted for this work expressed almost universal concern that the islands are being used for money laundering, particularly through the purchase of real estate. Although the strong Euro has made purchasing property in the Dutch Caribbean attractive for those in European Holland, in recent years, the islands have seen a proliferation of expensive housing projects, such as Santa Barbara and Sabadeoco in Bonaire, and the Spanish Water development in Curacao with an associated explosion of local real estate prices.

The use of the U.S. dollar by the BES islands (by contrast to the use of the Euro in the European part of the Netherland creates some money laundering risks. Nonetheless, those consulted for this work argue that the supervision of BES financial transactions by the Dutch Central Bank helps to control such risks. On the other hand, Aruba uses the Aruban Guilder, while the monetary union between Curacao and St. Martin uses the Netherlands Antillean Guilder by.^[21]

Although each of the governments have small Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and financial system controls that are relatively well seen by the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), financial system and oversight vulnerabilities remain.^[22] Moreover, experts consulted for this work worry that authorities on the island often lack adequate resources and technical training in money laundering issues.

Within money laundering, the use of cryptocurrencies is an emerging area of concern. Cryptocurrencies have been used to purchase properties in the Caribbean Netherlands.^[23] Authorities in the Dutch Caribbean are just beginning to develop the necessary technical skills to monitor and confront the problem. Beyond resources and technical skills, there are currently no vehicles for authorities to deny a permit based on questions about how the investor obtained the money to acquire the property. Although there are laws in the works to implement such screening for the Kingdom-administered BES countries and Aruba, experts consulted for this work believe they will take at least two years to pass and will not apply to the sovereign CAS countries where the problem is greatest.

Beyond real estate, there are a number of large casinos in Aruba, Curacao, and Sint Martin. Twelve casinos in Sint Martin are owned by the previously mentioned Corallo family, believed to be tied to corruption. Although the casinos are generally well-regulated,^[24] those consulted for this work expressed their concern over the potential for money laundering through them.^[25]

In addition, for a time, Curacao became a regional hub for international on-line gambling. Modification of local laws and increased oversight^[26] have curtailed the sector, but the situation is still considered of concern by authorities.

The Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in Curacao, with some weaknesses in supervision as with many FTZs globally, is believed to present risks for trade-based money laundering through the Dutch Caribbean.^[27] Concerns include the smuggling of cigarettes and other products. During 2016-2017, Venezuelan gold was believed laundered through the Curacao FTZ.^[28] In addition, an investigation of a shipment of Venezuelan gold seized in Aruba in 2018,^[29] led authorities to believe that as many as 48 shipments of Venezuelan gold had been laundered through the island.^[30]

The Chinese community, which mostly immigrated to the region generations ago from Emping (Guangdong China), is believed to play a role in the informal banking sector. Those consulted for this work are concerned that the Chinese may be moving money through their non-transparent international commercial networks, including between Curacao and Dubai.^[31] Dubai is of particular note as a preferred destination of a number of high-profile local rap artists and some criminals such as the well-known Utrecht-based Dutch gangster Riduan Taghi.^[32] Curacao-based narcotrafficker Tyson Quant, whose group “No limit soldiers” caused a spike in violence in the islands following the 10-10-10 government restructuring, was also captured in Dubai.^[33]

Finally, authorities have taken note of the expansion of Chinese supermarkets and restaurants throughout the islands. In Bonaire, for example, with a population of 34,000 people, there are an estimated 30-40 Chinese-owned supermarkets, often with little indication of business inside, despite perishable goods on their shelves. In Aruba, with a population of 109,000, there are 80-100 such Chinese shops.^[34]

By contrast to Chinese in other parts of the Caribbean, Chinese investors have not yet built significant tourism projects or made other investments in the Dutch Caribbean. A large Chinese-financed hotel project in Sint Martin proposed in 2016, “Pearl of China,”^[35] was not approved by local authorities. On a larger scale, a major Chinese petroleum company lost a bid to acquire the Shell Refinery in Curacao was also rejected by local authorities.^[36]

The source of money through which the Chinese are taking over increasing portions of the retail sector in the country is unknown but suspected to involve money laundering to some degree. Chinese businesspersons are also known to fund the campaigns of local politicians and develop sometimes inappropriate relationships with government officials. In 2017, the head of immigration in Curacao was arrested for accepting bribes to permit the entry of Chinese nationals.^[37] Nonetheless, almost universally, those consulted for this work expressed concern that their level of knowledge of and ability to penetrate the traditionally closed Chinese community to understand possible criminal dynamics, is limited.^[38]

Migration. As with drugs, the different geographic locations of Aruba, Bonaire and Curacao versus Sint Martin, Sint Eustasius and Saba, make the migration-related challenges of each island group different. The small populations of Aruba, Curacao, and to a lesser extent, Bonaire, have been particularly impacted by the outflow of Venezuelans with the collapse of the latter’s economy, and Venezuela’s increasingly authoritarian political system and criminality. According to those consulted for this work, undocumented Venezuelans may add as many as 16,000 to Aruba’s population of 109,000. Aruba’s location a mere 19 miles off the Venezuelan coast makes access easy. Dutch authorities note that some Ecuadorans have come to Bonaire as well, reflecting the expansion of violence in that country.

The employment of Venezuelan women, alongside of Colombians and others, as sex workers, and the exploitation of Venezuelan men in the construction sector on the island are particular challenges for law enforcement in Bonaire.^[39] A smaller Venezuelan gang, the Lobos, has also come to the attention of police in Curacao.^[40]

To some degree, Chinese criminal groups have also been involved in the migrant sex trade in the southern part of the Dutch Caribbean. According to those consulted for this work, the Chinese criminals working in the sex trade tend to work with Colombians and Dominicans, reflecting the fact that many of the Chinese themselves originally immigrated from Venezuela following the collapse of that economy, and speak Spanish better than Dutch as their second language.^[41]

The control of prostitution is complicated, because it is “tolerated” so long as there is not evidence that the women are not being coerced, and those identified by authorities rarely admit coercion. Venezuelan sex workers also regularly travel from island to island, making following them and the groups that organize their exploitation, difficult to identify. In Aruba, the San Nichols neighborhood has become a zone for such prostitution, while in Bonaire it is centers around the Gentleman’s Club Patchis, run by long-time local businessperson Harris Phillips, as well as local roadside bars known as “Snacks.”

To the North, the smaller islands of Sint Martin, Sint Eustasius and Saba are less impacted by Venezuelan immigrants and associated human trafficking issues. Following the devastation of Hurricane Irma in Sint Martin in 2017,^[42] there was an influx of Venezuelans to work in the construction sector rebuilding those islands, with as many as 6,000 undocumented Venezuelans on the island at the highpoint, although that work has largely dried up, and with it, the Venezuelan presence on the island.^[43]

For a time, Sint Martin had migrants from Cameroon, although that flow has subsided.^[44] Although some Haitians immigrate to Sint Martin, primarily seeking menial work in the hotel and gardening sectors, most Haitians and Cubans travel north towards the US Virgin Islands and Bahamas, seeking entry into the US under special visa provisions available to them, rather than migrating to the Dutch Caribbean. Those Haitians migrating East are reportedly usually more attracted to the proximate French-speaking, rather than English-speaking islands.

Cybersecurity. Beyond the challenges mentioned in the preceding sections, those consulted for this work mentioned cybersecurity issues as a growing concern. The electric power utility in Sint Martin, GEBE, for example, was the victim of a serious cyber-attack, with the effects continuing to have repercussions on the utility to this day.^[45] Those consulted expressed concern that the relatively small security organizations in the Dutch Caribbean, particularly those in the CAS islands, are struggling to have the technical capabilities and relationship with the business sector to effectively combat the new cyber challenges.

Violence. Overall, violence in the Dutch Caribbean has been relatively low compared to other regions, although higher than in the European Netherlands.^[46] On Curacao, the level increased to over 20 murders per 100,000 residents following the political restructuring of the Dutch Caribbean in 2010, but has subsequently fallen to approximately a quarter of that level.^[47]

Firearms. To date, the use of firearms have not been a major problem in the Dutch Caribbean to the degree that they have facilitated the expansion of violence in other parts of the region such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Turks and Caicos.^[48] Nonetheless, they are an increasing concern for those consulted for this work. In Curacao, one expert consulted for this work estimated that 80% of homicides, and 50% of robberies are committed with firearms.^[49]

For the Dutch islands in the Lesser Antilles, handguns, mostly smuggled in from the United States, are the principal problem. Guns and gun components fabricated by 3-D printers, including semi-automatic to automatic fire conversion kits,^[50] are also just beginning to emerge as concerns for Dutch Caribbean authorities. In the three Dutch Islands near Venezuela, guns smuggled from the Venezuelan military are also a concern.^[51]

Gangs. The Dutch Caribbean has not had difficulties with violent youth gangs, as some other nations in the Caribbean such as Trinidad and Tobago have. As noted previously, although Venezuelan gangs are involved in smuggling humans, drugs, firearms and an array of other illicit goods they have generally kept a low profile. ^[52] Sint Martin has had some problems with the “six” and “seven” gangs from Trinidad and Tobago,^[53] but the effect on public security more broadly has been limited.

Radical Islamic Networks. The Dutch Caribbean, to date, has not had a significant problem with radical Islamic groups. There are a small number of Mosques in the region involving multiple Islam-practicing ethnic communities. There is a small Lebanese community in the southern islands, principally of Venezuelan origin. There were some concerns about illicit financial activities of this community, although activities of concern reportedly fell off^[54] after Tareck al-Aissami, previously Venezuela’s oil minister and considered a key Venezuelan contact to illicit Lebanese financial networks, was deposed from his job as petroleum minister and arrested.^[55] Although there were some concerns about persons who had gone to fight for ISIS/ISIL returning to Aruba after the organization collapsed, virtually all of the persons identified as having risk-of-terrorism affiliations to date have converted to radical Islam in the Netherlands, or in US prisons.^[56] In 2023, burning of an Israeli flag by persons affiliated with a Sint Martin Mosque, protesting over Israel’s military campaign in Gaza,^[57] drew concern by the important Jewish community and local authorities on the Island, but has not revealed deeper problems to date.

Prisons. Although the situation of prisons in the Dutch Caribbean is generally better than many of the non-Dutch island governments in the region, the detention of Venezuelan migrants attempting to enter the country via illegal means, as well as those running drugs, is becoming an increasing problem. Almost 40% of the Bonaire prison population Curacao’s long-term detention facility is over-capacity, Aruba’s is at capacity, and Bonaire’s is approaching capacity. The prison in Sint Martin is also overcapacity and plans to build a new $51 million facility have progressed slowly. The situation has obliged authorities in some islands to make difficult decisions about who to detain, and who to release on their own recognizance, knowing they will almost certainly not show up for trial.^[58]

Climate Change. The increasing frequency of severe climate events and sea level rise are a concern for all of the small island states of the Dutch Caribbean. The concern is greatest, however, among the three islands in the Lesser Antilles, which are more in the path of tropical storms and hurricanes. Indeed, as noted previously, Sint Martin is still marked to this day by the damage from Hurricane Irma, which devastated the island in 2017.^[59]

Collaboration. Collaboration among law enforcement and government officials across the islands of the Dutch Caribbean, as well as cooperation with other parts of the region and external actors such as the United States is significant. Nonetheless, those consulted for this work almost uniformly noted that there is opportunity and need for improvement, particularly with respect to the interaction between the Dutch and English-speaking Caribbean.^[60]

In combatting narcotrafficking, the Dutch Coast Guard works closely with its counterparts from the U.S. Coast Guard 7^th District, including a U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) which regularly accompanies the previously mentioned WIGS frigate when it operates in the region.^[61] Such cooperation facilitates police actions against narcotraffickers, and the transfer of detained persons, confiscated drugs, and other cargo to U.S. authorities.^[62]

The Dutch Coast Guard is also embedded with the US Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) in Key West, Florida, and the operational intelligence picture it maintains for the region.^[63] The Dutch Coast Guard and Marines also participated along with the US and other Caribbean partners in regional exercises, such as Tradewinds, hosted by Barbados in May 2024.^[64]

The US and the Dutch also collaborate in the fight against drugs and criminal organizations in other ways, including a small US Drug Enforcement Agency presence under DEA Special Agent Lauren Carney in the US consulate in Curacao.^[65]

The governments of the Dutch Caribbean have a range of personal and institutional relationships with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) which facilitates coordination with the English-speaking part of the region, including Curacao’s associate membership in CARICOM itself since June 2024.^[66] Through such relationships, the Dutch island governments obtain access, and contribute to products of the CARICOM Impacts, including data from its Regional Intelligence Fusion Center (RIFC), the Caribbean Gun Intelligence Unit (CGIU), and the Caribbean Joint Regional Coordination Center (JRCC). The latter provides access to the CARICOM Advanced Passenger Information System, and on the customs side, the Advanced Cargo Information System. Among others.^[67]

In addition, Interpol has been an important mechanism for coordination, with the BES islands each having Interpol liaisons since 2021, bearing fruit in a number of successful operations involving coordination with the Interpol headquarters in Europe.^[68]

With respect to human ties, police chiefs from the Kingdom governments participate in regional events such as a regional security conference in Trinidad and Tobago in November 2024,^[69] bringing together 17 governments from across the Caribbean basin, including Colombia (although not Venezuela or Jamaica).

Within the Dutch Caribbean, the Kingdom of Netherlands government facilitates cooperation through a number of organizational mechanisms, technical platforms, and leader interactions. The Recherche Samenwerkingsteam (RST) Special Police Task Force, for example, is a Kingdom of the Netherlands organization which provides detectives, intelligence analysts, and other specialists to the islands to both bolster their capacity and facilitate coordination.^[70]

In addition, the new Inter-Island Connection Platform (IICP) for information sharing among different law enforcement organizations in the Dutch Caribbean has demonstrated promise for facilitating law enforcement insight across the islands. Experts consulted for this work note, however, that it needs continuing leadership support to ensure the person assigned to it have the high-level backing, resources, and time within their organizations to contribute.^[71]

At a senior level, the Board of Chiefs of Police of the Dutch Caribbean Police Forces is another important vehicle for training programs, knowledge sharing, and trust building.^[72]

One issue complicating collaboration has been the complex relationships between the Dutch Caribbean islands, and problematic actors such as Venezuela. Although foreign policy for the Kingdom is formally decided in the Hague, in practice, governments geographically close to Venezuela, particularly Aruba and Curacao, have been allowed some autonomy on commercial and other relationships.^[73]

As the Maduro government has taken an increasingly authoritarian and criminal turn and the relationships with the Dutch Caribbean, particularly the non-autonomous BES islands and Aruba, has become more limited, the continuing relationship between Curacao and Venezuela has been used as an alternative channel. Aruba, for example, with whom the Maduro administration closed its air and maritime borders, deports intercepted Venezuelan migrants back to Venezuela through Curacao.^[74]

Beyond existing collaboration, those consulted for this work highlighted a need for the Kingdom of the Netherlands to strengthen its cooperation with Latin American governments playing key roles in ongoing drug, migration, and other security challenges. While emphasizing that the governments of the Dutch Caribbean have important ongoing cooperation with states such as Colombia, Panama and the Dominican Republic, experts expressed the importance of strengthened cooperation with Ecuador, a source of refugees to the region, as well as Costa Rica,^[75] an important anchor for good governance and law enforcement cooperation in Central America intersection with the Caribbean, but whose security situation is deteriorating.^[76]

Conclusion

The Dutch Caribbean may be one of the few instances in which the needed response from Washington DC is not the dedication of greater resources and private sector investment, but rather, increased attention, cooperation, and work to make better use of the islands’ relative “good news story.” Washington has an opportunity to better use the relative success of the Dutch Caribbean to partially insulate itself against the deleterious effects of an ever growing array of regional challenges, through transparency and good government, as an example, and for insight and concrete building blocks in its approach for other parts of the region. With respect to increased coordination between Washington and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, there is a 2016 Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation on organized crime between the US and the Kingdom that could serve as part of the basis for such expanded cooperation.^[77]

Working with the Dutch, among other partners, promoting examples of good governance, capturing lessons learned and leveraging the Dutch to help export good governance and transparency elsewhere can play an important role tackling the region’s challenges. In a similar fashion. The Dutch, and the Kingdom islands in the Caribbean are logical partners in wrestling with transcendent challenges such as Venezuela and China, among others. In a time in which the region faces an unprecedented array of challenges, it is important for Washington to take full advantage of such opportunities and partnerships.

Endnotes:

1. The author is Latin America Research Professor with the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. The views expressed here are his own. ↑
2. “Constitutional changes as of 10 October 2010,” Dutch Caribbean Legal Portal, October 14, 2010, http://www.dutchcaribbeanlegalportal.com/news/publications/65-editorials/editorials/1215-constitutional-changes-as-of-10-october-2010. ↑
3. Laura Loaiza, “Colombia’s Coca Crops Grew, But Cocaine Production Exploded, Latest Figures Show,” Insight Crime, October 18, 2024, https://insightcrime.org/news/colombias-coca-crops-grew-cocaine-production-exploded/. ↑
4. Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Rubi Bledsoe, and Andrea Michelle Ceren, “Tracking Transatlantic Drug Flows,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 19, 2023, https://features.csis.org/tracking-transatlantic-drug-flows-cocaines-path-from-south-america-across-the-caribbean-to-europe/index.html. ↑
5. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
6. Mario Saiz, “Narco-Subs Sail the Caribbean,” Insight Crime, September 19, 2024, https://insightcrime.org/news/caribbean-traffickers-narco-subs-beat-drug-busts/. ↑
7. Hernandez-Roy, et., al., 2023. ↑
8. Dutch Netherlands security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
9. Ibid. ↑
10. Ibid. ↑
11. “‘Ndrangheta, Main European Ally of Latin American Narcotraffickers,” Dialogo, February 14, 2023, https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/ndrangheta-main-european-ally-of-latin-american-narcotraffickers/. ↑
12. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
13. “Gerrit Schotte found guilty and sentenced to three years in prison,” Dutch Caribbean Legal Portal, March 11, 2016, http://www.dutchcaribbeanlegalportal.com/legal-documents/judgments/137-judgements/6683-gerrit-schotte-found-guilty-and-sentenced-to-three-years-in-prison. ↑
14. Bojana Jovanović, Stevan Dojčinović, and Svetlana Đokić, “Bad Blood: A War Between Montenegrin Cocaine Clans Engulfs the Balkans,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, May 5, 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/project/balkan-cocaine-wars/bad-blood-a-war-between-montenegrin-cocaine-clans-engulfs-the-balkans. ↑
15. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
16. “Hell’s Angels and Satudarah on Curaçao,” Knipselkrant, January 24, 2016, https://knipselkrant-curacao.com/amigoe-hells-angels-en-satudarah-op-curacao/. ↑
17. “Seizing 37 Tons at Sea: A Deep-Dive of the Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard’s C4ISR Maritime Surveillance,” Cartenav, August 27, 2024, https://cartenav.com/case-study/dccg/. ↑
18. “In Focus: The Royal Navy Presence in the Caribbean,” Navy Lookout, January 15, 2020, ↑
19. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024, https://www.navylookout.com/in-focus-the-royal-navy-presence-in-the-caribbean/. ↑
20. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
21. Jason Fernando, “Netherlands Antillean Guilder (ANG): What It is, How It Works,” Investopedia, December 30, 2022, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/forex/a/ang-netherlands-antilles-guilder.asp. ↑
22. H.C.J. van der Veen and L.F. Heuts, “National Risk Assessment on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 2021: Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba,” Kingdom of the Netherlands government, 2021, https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/3115/Cahier-2021-14a-full-text.pdf. ↑
23. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
24. See, for example, “AML/CFT framework,” Aruba Central Bank official website, Accessed October 26, 2024, https://www.cbaruba.org/integrity-supervision-aml-cft-framework. ↑
25. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
26. Erik Gibbs, “Curaçao Again Pushes Back Online Gambling Reform Time Line,” Casino.org, January 4, 2023, https://www.casino.org/news/curacao-pushes-back-online-gambling-reform-timeframe-again/. ↑
27. See, for example, “Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern – Curacao,” Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. State Department, 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2016/vol2/253394.htm. ↑
28. Bram Ebus, “These idyllic Caribbean islands are trading illegal Venezuelan gold. Can it be stopped?” Miami Herald, July 23, 2019, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article232461642.html#storylink=cpy. ↑
29. “Answer to parliamentary questions about Venezuelan conflict gold that is traded via Curaçao and Aruba,” Curacao Chronicle, September 19, 2019, https://www.curacaochronicle.com/post/main/answer-to-parliamentary-questions-about-venezuelan-conflict-gold-that-is-traded-via-curacao-and-aruba/. ↑
30. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
31. Ibid. ↑
32. Laura Dubois and Jude Weber, “‘Super cartel’ member sentenced to life in Dutch prison,” Financial Times, February 27, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/c0dd3833-c348-47a0-801f-771e486203b8. ↑
33. “Dubai authorities arrest No Limit Soldiers leader,” The Daily Herald, November 26, 2020, https://www.thedailyherald.sx/islands/dubai-authorities-arrest-no-limit-soldiers-leader. ↑
34. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
35. “Chinese to develop 326-room hotel, 450 apartments in Bel-Air,” SXM Talks, September 2, 2016, https://www.sxm-talks.com/local-news/chinese-to-develop-326-room-hotel-450-apartments-in-bel-air/. ↑
36. Scott B. Macdonald, “Caribbean Geopolitics and Curaçao’s Isla Refinery,” Global Americans, December 8, 2023, https://globalamericans.org/caribbean-geopolitics-and-curacaos-isla-refinery/#:~:text=It%20was%20soon%20revealed%20that%20GZE%20had%20never,was%20unable%20to%20assume%20such%20a%20large%20project. ↑
37. “Head of admission gets higher sentence,” Curacao, February 25, 2021, https://curacao.nu/hoofd-toelating-krijgt-hogere-straf/. “Illegal permit issuance doesn’t imply passport,” The Daily Herald, August 31, 2017, https://www.thedailyherald.sx/islands/illegal-permit-issuance-doesn-t-imply-passport. ↑
38. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
39. Ibid. ↑
40. “Court sentences 114 years in prison for murder of Venezuelan businessman,” Curacao Chronicles, July 17, 2024, https://www.curacaochronicle.com/post/local/court-sentences-114-years-in-prison-for-murder-of-venezuelan-businessman/. ↑
41. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
42. Sarah Almukhtar, Jeremy White and Karen Yourish, “Hurricane Irma’s Vast Destruction in

    the Caribbean, Building by Building,” The New York Times, September 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/17/world/americas/irma-caribbean-damage.html#:~:text=Both%20the%20French%20and%20Dutch%20sides%20of%20St.,Philipsburg%2C%20the%20Dutch%20capital%2C%20were%20damaged%20or%20destroyed. ↑

43. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
44. Ibid. ↑
45. Ibid. ↑
46. “Major study on murder and manslaughter on the Netherlands Antilles,” University of Leiden, August 6, 2018,” https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/in-the-media/2018/08/major-study-on-murder-and-manslaughter-on-the-netherlands-antilles. ↑
47. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
48. Juliana Manjarrés and Christopher Newton, “InSight Crime’s 2023 Homicide Round-Up,” Insight Crime, February 21, 2024, https://insightcrime.org/news/insight-crime-2023-homicide-round-up/. ↑
49. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
50. “Discovery of 3D-printed ‘ghost guns’ alarms Antigua and Barbuda police,” Caribbean News Network, September 6, 2023, https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/news/caribbean-news/discovery-of-3d-printed-ghost-guns-alarms-antigua-and-barbuda-police/. ↑
51. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
52. Ibid. ↑
53. “St. Maarten and Trinidad police cooperate in investigation of ‘Plumpy Boss’ shooting,” The Daily Herald,” July 31, 2024, https://www.thedailyherald.sx/islands/st-maarten-and-trinidad-police-cooperate-in-investigation-of-plumpy-boss-shooting. ↑
54. Ibid. ↑
55. Vanessa Buschschlüter, “Venezuela’s ex-oil minister El Aissami reappears – in handcuffs,” BBC, April 10, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-68779090. ↑
56. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
57. “Public statement on the prohibition of a solidarity march on SXM about the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza,” Sint Martin News Network, November 10, 2023, https://smn-news.com/index.php/st-maarten-st-martin-news/44302-public-statement-on-the-prohibition-of-a-solidarity-march-on-sxm-about-the-ongoing-humanitarian-crisis-in-gaza.html. ↑
58. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
59. Sarah Almukhtar, Jeremy White and Karen Yourish, “Hurricane Irma’s Vast Destruction in

    the Caribbean, Building by Building,” The New York Times, September 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/17/world/americas/irma-caribbean-damage.html#:~:text=Both%20the%20French%20and%20Dutch%20sides%20of%20St.,Philipsburg%2C%20the%20Dutch%20capital%2C%20were%20damaged%20or%20destroyed. ↑

60. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
61. “Coast Guard Cutter Resolute crew returns home, offloads approximately $115 million worth of drugs in St. Petersburg,” United States Coast Guard News, October 23, 2024, https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/3944058/coast-guard-cutter-resolute-crew-returns-home-offloads-approximately-115-millio/. ↑
62. “Coast Guard Cutter Resolute returns home with $115 million in seized drugs,” Stars and Stripes, October 25, 2024, https://www.stripes.com/branches/coast_guard/2024-10-25/coast-guard-cutter-resolute-drug-seizure-patrol-migrants-15616470.html. ↑
63. “30 years collaboration between the United States of America and the Netherlands, in counter drug trafficking operations, is marked with the return of patrol ship for the Caribbean Region,” EA News, April 9, 2024, https://www.eanews.com/30-years-collaboration-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-netherlands-in-counter-drug-trafficking-operations-is-marked-with-the-return-of-patrol-ship-for-the-caribbean-region// ↑
64. “BROLL Netherlands Marines conduct dynamic range at TRADEWINDS 24,” Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, May 4, 2024, https://www.dvidshub.net/video/922058/broll-netherlands-marines-conduct-dynamic-range-tradewinds-24. ↑
65. “DEA Appoints Special Agent Lauren Carney as Country Attaché for Curacao, Marking Historic Milestone,” U.S. Consulate General in Curacao, official website, May 6, 2024, https://cw.usconsulate.gov/dea-appoints-special-agent-lauren-carney-as-country-attache-for-curacao-marking-historic-milestone/. ↑
66. “Curaçao’s Bid for CARICOM Associate Membership Confirmed,” Van Holland Curacao, June 14, 2024, https://www.vanhollandcuracao.com/2024/06/caricom/curacao-has-been-granted-associate-membership-in-the-caribbean-community-caricom/. ↑
67. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
68. “Collaboration between INTERPOL and the Dutch Caribbean Police Force is bearing fruit,” 721 News, August 2, 2022, https://www.721news.com/2022/08/collaboration-between-interpol-and-the-dutch-caribbean-police-force-is-bearing-fruit/. ↑
69. “T&T To Host Caribbean Security Conference,” Tobago Updates, Accessed October 27m 2024, https://tobagoupdates.com/tt-to-host-caribbean-security-conference/. ↑
70. “Recherche Samenwerkingsteam (RST),” Recherche Samenwerkingsteam official website, Accessed October 27, 2024, https://rstpolitie.com/. ↑
71. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
72. “Police forces enhance their training with Dutch Caribbean Police Chiefs’ support,” The Daily Herald, December 19, 2023, https://www.thedailyherald.sx/islands/police-forces-enhance-their-training-with-dutch-caribbean-police-chiefs-support. ↑
73. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
74. “Aruba extends its border closure with Venezuela for four more months,” Aruba Gobierno, August 21, 2024, https://www.gobierno.aw/en/aruba-extends-its-border-closure-with-venezuela-for-four-more-months. ↑
75. security expert interviewed off-the-record, Bonaire, October 2024. ↑
76. Kate Linthicum, “Costa Rica, the once-peaceful land of ‘pura vida,’ battles violence as cocaine trade grows,” Los Angeles Times, September 14, 2023, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-09-14/costa-rica-battling-record-violence-cocaine-trade#:~:text=But%20this%20year%20Costa%20Rica%20is%20on%20track,of%20drugs%20has%20come%20a%20new%20narco%20culture. ↑
77. “Netherlands/United States: MoU on Strengthening Criminal Justice in Caribbean,” Library of Congress, June 17, 2016, https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2016-06-17/netherlandsunited-states-mou-on-strengthening-criminal-justice-in-caribbean/. ↑